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FIOTIONAL LOST GRANT IN PRESCRIPTION-
A NOOTUOUS ARCHAISM
J. W. SIMONTON*
"In order to establish a right of way over the lands
of another by prescription, it must appear that the use
and enjoyment thereof by the claimant was adverse,
under a claim of right, exclusive, continuous, uninter-
rupted, and with the knowledge and acquiescence of the
owner of the land over which it passes, and that such
use has continued for a period of at least twenty
years. * * *
"Where a way has thus been used openly and unin-
terruptedly, continuously and exclusively, for a period
of more than twenty years, the origin of the way not
being shown, there is a presumption of a right or grant
from the long acquiescence of the party on whose land
the way is. This presumption of a right or grant is
prima facie and may be rebutted by showing that the
right of way originated in a permission, or a license,
granted by the owner of the land for his neighbor to
pass over it, or by showing that during the prescription
period of twenty years the owner of the estate claimed
to be servient denied the right of the owner of the
dominant estate and converted the right of way into
one of permission only."'
"The flight of the long time requisite to vest the right
under the old law afforded a conclusive presumption
.that there had been an express grant of the easement,
its evidence lost by the tooth of time, and no proof that
it never existed could be heard; whereas, under the new
rule user for the statutory period raises only *a prima
facie presumption of a grant, which may be re-
pelled. * * * To establish a right of way under the
modern law, it must appear that it has been exercised
for the statutory period, with the acquiescence of the
owner over whose land the way is claimed. True, such
user without more, is taken to be with his acquiescence
and knowledge, and prima facie gives the right; but if
it appears that the user is against his protests, and
that he denied the right, the right cannot become vested
from the time of user."2
Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
Williams v. Green, 111 Va. 205, 206-7, 68 S. E. 253 (1910).
2 Woolbridge v. Coughlin, 46 W. Va. 345, 348, 33 S. E. 233. (1899).
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1PICTIONAL LOST GRANT IN PRESCRIPTION
In the above quotations the courts purport to express the
law of Virginia and of West Virginia, there being but one
important variation between them which seems to have
arisen through a misconception of the Virginia court."
That courts have long had a strong policy favoring the ac-
quisition of easements by adverse user is apparent. Since
legislatures have usually made no provisions for the acquisi-
tion of easements by adverse user, the courts have had to cre-
ate the law as to prescription. When the time required
to get title to land by adverse possession was reduced to
twenty years in England, the courts, instead of applying
this statute by analogy, took the ancient fiction of a lost
grant based on proof of immemorial user, and adapted it by
reducing the period of requisite user to the period of the
new statute of limitations. The presumption of a lost
grant from proof of immemorial user was said to be con-
clusive, but it could not well be otherwise since no evi-
dence to the contrary could be available.4 But with the
time of requisite user reduced to twenty years, the testi-
mony of the servient owner and others who knew the real
facts would often be available. Hence the question arose as
to whether the presumption of a lost grant was still con-
clusive or whether the real facts could be shown in rebuttal.
Most of the courts in this country eventually held that the
presumption was conclusive,' but some of them still insisted
it was only a prinm facie presumption and could be rebutted.
Hence there came to be two alleged rules-the conclusive
3 In Cornett v. Rhudy, 80 Va. 710 (1885) the Virginia court held that
user for statutory period was not enough but that the user must be for at
least twenty years. The court relied on statements in Lomax and Minor
and on English cases and evidently was not aware that the twenty year
period in England was as it was, solely because that was the statutory
period. This the Virginia court took to be the common law rule. As a re-
sult the West Virginia court, evidently puzzled, stated there was a common
law rule requiring twenty years user, and a statutory rule requiring ten
years user but the West Virginia courts have always followed the rule that
ten years user is sufficient. As to the facts of the origin and effect of the
English rule see TrFFANY, REAL PROP. (2nd ed.) 2028-9; JONES, FASEUENTS,
§158.
4 True the statute of Edw. L. c. 39 (1275) fixed the time of legal memory
at 1189 for the writ of right and at 1217 for other actions and it is possi-
ble evidence on the matter might occasionally have been adduced, yet the
shortest period was fifty-eight years and each year that passed added a year
to this time, so that soon no direct evidence could be produced.
r See TIFFANY, REAL PROP. (2nd ed.) 2030; 19 C. J. 8734; JoNEs, EAsE-
MENTS, §162.
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presumption rule, and the prima facie presumption rule.'
The Virginia and West Virginia courts are adherents of the
prima facie presumption rule, but the fact is that the law
of these states does not differ materially in this respect
from that of the conclusive presumption jurisdictions. Our
courts are merely talking about a different thing without
seeming to be aware of it.'
A presumption is a conclusion drawn from proof of cer-
tain facts and circumstances. It is so drawn because in
most cases where certain facts are established the thing pre-
sumed is true, but the other party may show by evidence
that this case is the unusual or exceptional case-that the
presumed thing is not true in the particular case. He may
rebut the presumption. But the presumption of a lost
grant is not a true presumption, because the thing pre-
sumed is admittedly a fiction-is admittedly not true in a
majority of cases. Proof of adverse user of a way for ten
years or for twenty years does not justify the inference that
there was a grant of the easement which has been lost.
We know well that that is not true in one per cent of the
cases. That is not the reason for the presumption. The
real reason is the desire to apply the statute of limitations
to adverse user by analogy, hence the courts resorted to
make-believe-they invented a fiction, but as is the case
with other fictions they cannot permit a direct attack to be
made on it. So, though the presumption is said to be re-
buttable in Virginia and West Virginia, the servient owner
is not in fact permitted to rebut the presumption at all.8
He cannot show that the thing presumed from the evidence
is not true, namely, that no grant was ever made. The
courts erroneously assert that he may rebut the presump-
tion, but all he is permitted to do is to attack the character
of the user which the evidence tends to prove in order to
show there was not the kind of user necessary to raise the
presumption. The claimant, for example, proves he has
used the way more than ten years, without any explanation
as to the origin of the user. That raises a presumption the
a See note to TnE BAR, April 15, p. 42; 27 W. VA. LAW QuAR. 265.
7 JONES, EASEMENTS, §163.
8 At least there seems to be no cases in which this was permitted.
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user is under a claim of right, and that it is adverse to the
owner. The claimant has thus made a prima facie case.'
The owner is not permitted to testify he never made any
grant of the alleged easement for that would attack the
fiction directly. But the owner may prove that the user
began by permission, thus showing there was in fact no
user of the sort required to raise the presumption of a lost
grant." Or he may show he made protests at various times
against the use, thus showing, under the peculiar doctrine
of our law, that the user was not of the character .required
to raise the presumption." Or presumably he may show
that at the time the user began, the landowner was an in-
fant or insane so as to be incapable of making a grant, but
again the effect of this proof is to show the requisite user
has not been proved, since it is usually held the user must
be against one suw jurg, at least at its beginning." All
0 Foreman v. Greenburg, 88 W. Va. 376, 106 S. E. 876 (1921); Roberts
v. Ward, 85 W. Va. 474, 102 S. E. 96 (1920) ; Staggers v. Hines, 87 W. Va.
65, 104 S. E. 768 (1920) ; Mitchell v. Bowman, 74 W. Va. 498, 82 S. E. 330
(1914).
10 Bartrug v. Edgell, 80 W. Va. 220, 92 S. E. 438 (1917); Graham v.
Thompson, 143 Va. 29, 129 S. E. 272 (1925); Pruitt v. Shaffer, 137 Va. 658,
120 S. E. 275 (1923).
11 Gwinn v. Gwinn, 77 W. Va. 281, 87 S. E. 371 (1915) ; Woolbridge V.
Coughlin, supra, n. 2; Nichols v. Aylor, 7 Leigh 546 (1836).
The doctrine that the adverse user could be effectively interrupted by pro-
test by the landowner seems to have originated in the latter case, the court
holding this showed he did not acquiesce in the user. This has been con-
sistently followed in Virginia and West Virginia. It is very difficult to see
why verbal protests which are disregarded by the claimant should have any
other effect than to show the user was under a strong claim of right. See
good discussion of this in Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. McFarlan, 43 N. J. L.
605 (1881). The great weight of authority is contra to the doctrine. The
Virginia court in the Nichols Case seemed to believed the word "acquiesce"
must have some meaning other than that accorded to it by most courts.
12 It is said that where the landowner is an infant or under such dis-
ability that he could not have made a grant at the commencement of the
user, the user will not give rise to the presumption. There must be the
requisite user from a time when the landowner is not under disability.
Some courts require the requisite period of user while the owner of the
land is sui juris deducting all periods during which the owner is under
disability. Others hold that if the landowner is able to make a grant at
the beginning of the user the fact the land subsequently comes into the
hands of one under disability does not prevent the prescriptive time from
running. See TIFFANY, REAL PROP. (2nd ed.) 2068. The latter accords
with the application of the statute of limitation by analogy. There seem
to be no cases in this state. It may be questioned whether the twenty year
absolute limit of W. VA. CODE ch. 104, §4, would also be applied in this
state to adverse user. That is, whether adverse use for over twenty years
would give the right regardless of the disability of the landowner.
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these so-called means of rebutting the presumption do not
rebut it, but all of them attack the facts from which the
presumption arises and tend to prove the proper facts do
not exist. Clearly all our courts mean by the rebuttable
presumption is that the landowner may overcome the claim-
ant's prinva facie case by showing there was not the neces-
sary kind of user for the proper period. What the courts
usually mean when they say the presumption of a grant is
conclusive, is that if the requisite kind and length of user
is established on all the evidence introduced at the trial,
then the presumption is conclusive. This seems to be the
established law in Virginia and West Virginia because the
landowner does not attack the fiction by direct evidence
but only attacks the character of the user proved by the
claimant."
It has taken centuries to build up the statement of law
quoted above. The reluctance of the English courts to ad-
mit they were actually making law, seemingly caused them
to adopt the fiction and thus pretend they were merely ap-
plying law already existing. Whether this was justifiable
at the time need not concern us now, but now our courts
frankly admit they are applying the statute of limitations
by analogy. It is therefore time the whole archaic struc-
ture was swept away and the simple straight-forward
course adopted. The courts of some jurisdictions have done
this and no apparent disaster has followed such radi-
calism."
It may be noted that not only is the above statement of
law based on an admitted fiction, but in the course of time
it has gathered a lot of barnacles, which serve to slow down
and clog the administration of justice in this sort of cases.
For example, the term "exclusive" does not mean exclusive
but proprietary." In nearly every case it is contended with
great vigor that the use was not exclusive because one or
13 "Whenever therefore there has been such use for a long period, the
bona fides of the claim is established, and the owner of the servicnt estate
must rebut the presumption of right, by showing leave or license from him,
or protest and objection under such circumstances as to repel the pre-
sumption." Walton v. Knight, 62 W. Va. 223, 227, 58 S. E. 1025 (1007).
Note he cannot rebut by showing he never made a grant. The same may
be noted in the excerpt from the Virginia case at the head of this paper.
14 See cases cited in 27 W. VA. L. QuAB. 265.
15 Aluncy v. Updyke, 119 Va. 636, 89 S. E. 884 (1916).
5
Simonton: Fictional Lost Grant in Prescription--A Nocuous Archaism
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1928
FICTIONAL LOST GRANT IN PRESCRIPTION
more other persons had also used the way, and the courts
have again and again spent time disposing of this conten-
tion.1 The term "acquiescence" does not mean with con-
sent or permission as one might suppose, but means that
the landowner did not consent nor did he openly object. 7
If he actually did acquiesce in the user at the beginning
this would usually be fatal to the plaintiff's case, and our
courts also hold verbal protests against the user is fatal.
In almost every case it is contended the landowner did not
acquiesce and the court must carefully explain what this
term means.'" The "knowledge" of the landowner is im-
material. All that is essential is the user be open and
notorious. The "claim of right" is presumed from con-
tinued and unexplained user. 9 In fact an open adverse
user for the requisite period without objection of the land-
owner, he being a person sui juris, is all that is essential.
Yet in order to understand the statement of the rule of
law given above one is compelled to delve deeply into the
history of prescription, and then to determine the peculiar
and extraordinary legal meanings of the terms above re-
ferred to. There is no good reason for preserving such
archaisms. Frankly applying the statute of limitations by
analogy would simplify and clarify the law and could not
but prove beneficial. Courts if so disposed could do much
to clarify the law at such points as this bringing about a
great simplification of the language in which it is expressed,
without making any change at all in its effect.
10 The question is discussed in Boyd v. Woolwine, 40 W. Va. 282, 21 S.
E. 1020 (1895); Walton v. Knight, supra, n. 13; Roberts v. Ward, supra,
n. 9; Foreman v. Greenburg, supra, n. 9.
17 See cases in n. 11, supra.
18 Bartrug v. Edgell, supra, n. 10; Turner v. Improvement Co., 118 Va.
720, 88 S. E. 85 (1916).
I Woolbridge v. Coughlin, supra, n. 2 (1899) ; Roberts v. Ward, supra, n.
16.
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